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    <title>Cryptography FM - Episodes Tagged with “Post Quantum Cryptography”</title>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 08 Dec 2020 16:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
    <description>Cryptography FM is a regular podcast with news and a featured interview covering the latest developments in theoretical and applied cryptography. Whether it's a new innovative paper on lattice-based cryptography or a novel attack on a secure messaging protocol, we'll get the people behind it on Cryptography FM.
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    <itunes:subtitle>In-depth, substantive discussions on the latest news and research in applied cryptography.</itunes:subtitle>
    <itunes:author>Symbolic Software</itunes:author>
    <itunes:summary>Cryptography FM is a regular podcast with news and a featured interview covering the latest developments in theoretical and applied cryptography. Whether it's a new innovative paper on lattice-based cryptography or a novel attack on a secure messaging protocol, we'll get the people behind it on Cryptography FM.
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      <itunes:email>nadim@symbolic.software</itunes:email>
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  <title>Episode 11: Breaking the Rainbow Post-Quantum Cryptography Candidate!</title>
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  <pubDate>Tue, 08 Dec 2020 16:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
  <author>Symbolic Software</author>
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  <itunes:episode>11</itunes:episode>
  <itunes:title>Episode 11: Breaking the Rainbow Post-Quantum Cryptography Candidate!</itunes:title>
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  <itunes:author>Symbolic Software</itunes:author>
  <itunes:subtitle>Serious weaknesses are uncovered in one of NIST's post-quantum cryptography finalists. Ward Beullens joins us to talk about his new research and more.</itunes:subtitle>
  <itunes:duration>38:08</itunes:duration>
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  <description>The race for post-quantum cryptographic signature primitives is in its final lap over at NIST, which recently announced DILITHIUM, FALCON and Rainbow as the three signature primitive finalists. But a paper recently published by KU Leuven researcher Ward Beullens claims to find serious weaknesses in the security of Rainbow, one of those three finalists. In fact, the paper claims that the weaknesses are so severe that Rainbow’s security parameters now fall short of the security requirements set out by the NIST post-quantum competition.
But how does Rainbow work, and how do these weaknesses affect it? And why weren’t they spotted until now? We discuss this and more in this week’s episode of Cryptography FM.
Links and papers discussed in the show:
* Improved Cryptanalysis of UOV and Rainbow (https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1343)
* SQISign: compact post-quantum signatures from quaternions and isogenies (https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1240)
Music composed by Toby Fox and performed by Sean Schafianski (https://seanschafianski.bandcamp.com/). Special Guest: Ward Beullens.
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  <itunes:keywords>post-quantum cryptography,signature schemes</itunes:keywords>
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    <![CDATA[<p>The race for post-quantum cryptographic signature primitives is in its final lap over at NIST, which recently announced DILITHIUM, FALCON and Rainbow as the three signature primitive finalists. But a paper recently published by KU Leuven researcher Ward Beullens claims to find serious weaknesses in the security of Rainbow, one of those three finalists. In fact, the paper claims that the weaknesses are so severe that Rainbow’s security parameters now fall short of the security requirements set out by the NIST post-quantum competition.</p>

<p>But how does Rainbow work, and how do these weaknesses affect it? And why weren’t they spotted until now? We discuss this and more in this week’s episode of Cryptography FM.</p>

<p>Links and papers discussed in the show:</p>

<ul>
<li><a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1343" rel="nofollow">Improved Cryptanalysis of UOV and Rainbow</a></li>
<li><a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1240" rel="nofollow">SQISign: compact post-quantum signatures from quaternions and isogenies</a></li>
</ul>

<p>Music composed by Toby Fox and performed by <a href="https://seanschafianski.bandcamp.com/" rel="nofollow">Sean Schafianski</a>.</p><p>Special Guest: Ward Beullens.</p><p>Sponsored By:</p><ul><li><a rel="nofollow" href="https://symbolic.software">Symbolic Software</a>: <a rel="nofollow" href="https://symbolic.software">This episode is sponsored by Symbolic Software. Symbolic Software helps you bring in the experience and knowledge necessary to design, or prove secure, state-of-the-art cryptographic systems for new solutions. We've helped design and formally verify some of the world's most widely used cryptographic protocols.</a></li></ul>]]>
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  <itunes:summary>
    <![CDATA[<p>The race for post-quantum cryptographic signature primitives is in its final lap over at NIST, which recently announced DILITHIUM, FALCON and Rainbow as the three signature primitive finalists. But a paper recently published by KU Leuven researcher Ward Beullens claims to find serious weaknesses in the security of Rainbow, one of those three finalists. In fact, the paper claims that the weaknesses are so severe that Rainbow’s security parameters now fall short of the security requirements set out by the NIST post-quantum competition.</p>

<p>But how does Rainbow work, and how do these weaknesses affect it? And why weren’t they spotted until now? We discuss this and more in this week’s episode of Cryptography FM.</p>

<p>Links and papers discussed in the show:</p>

<ul>
<li><a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1343" rel="nofollow">Improved Cryptanalysis of UOV and Rainbow</a></li>
<li><a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1240" rel="nofollow">SQISign: compact post-quantum signatures from quaternions and isogenies</a></li>
</ul>

<p>Music composed by Toby Fox and performed by <a href="https://seanschafianski.bandcamp.com/" rel="nofollow">Sean Schafianski</a>.</p><p>Special Guest: Ward Beullens.</p><p>Sponsored By:</p><ul><li><a rel="nofollow" href="https://symbolic.software">Symbolic Software</a>: <a rel="nofollow" href="https://symbolic.software">This episode is sponsored by Symbolic Software. Symbolic Software helps you bring in the experience and knowledge necessary to design, or prove secure, state-of-the-art cryptographic systems for new solutions. We've helped design and formally verify some of the world's most widely used cryptographic protocols.</a></li></ul>]]>
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