web01.fireside.fm Sat, 25 Apr 2026 13:57:01 -0500 Fireside (https://fireside.fm) Cryptography FM - Episodes Tagged with “Gprs” https://cryptography.fireside.fm/tags/gprs Tue, 20 Jul 2021 16:00:00 +0200 Cryptography FM is a regular podcast with news and a featured interview covering the latest developments in theoretical and applied cryptography. Whether it's a new innovative paper on lattice-based cryptography or a novel attack on a secure messaging protocol, we'll get the people behind it on Cryptography FM. en-us episodic In-depth, substantive discussions on the latest news and research in applied cryptography. Symbolic Software Cryptography FM is a regular podcast with news and a featured interview covering the latest developments in theoretical and applied cryptography. Whether it's a new innovative paper on lattice-based cryptography or a novel attack on a secure messaging protocol, we'll get the people behind it on Cryptography FM. no cryptography Symbolic Software nadim@symbolic.software Episode 20: Cryptanalysis of GPRS: GEA-1 and GEA-2! https://cryptography.fireside.fm/20 b60866a9-b2e2-4f18-afa5-9e85ed75887d Tue, 20 Jul 2021 16:00:00 +0200 Symbolic Software 20 Episode 20: Cryptanalysis of GPRS: GEA-1 and GEA-2! full Symbolic Software Were GPRS's encryption ciphers deliberately backdoored? Nadim discusses this question with cryptanalysts Gaëtan Leurent and Håvard Raddum. 42:56 no A team of cryptanalysits presents the first publicly available cryptanalytic attacks on the GEA-1 and GEA-2 algorithms. Instead of providing full 64-bit security, they show that the initial state of GEA-1 can be recovered from as little as 65 bits of known keystream (with at least 24 bits coming from one frame) in time 240 GEA-1 evaluations and using 44.5 GiB of memory. The attack on GEA-1 is based on an exceptional interaction of the deployed LFSRs and the key initialization, which is highly unlikely to occur by chance. This unusual pattern indicates that the weakness is intentionally hidden to limit the security level to 40 bit by design. Cryptanalysis of the GPRS Encryption Algorithms GEA-1 and GEA-2 (https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/819) Music composed by Toby Fox and performed by Sean Schafianski (https://seanschafianski.bandcamp.com/). Special Guests: Gaëtan Leurent and Håvard Raddum. gprs,cryptanalysis A team of cryptanalysits presents the first publicly available cryptanalytic attacks on the GEA-1 and GEA-2 algorithms. Instead of providing full 64-bit security, they show that the initial state of GEA-1 can be recovered from as little as 65 bits of known keystream (with at least 24 bits coming from one frame) in time 240 GEA-1 evaluations and using 44.5 GiB of memory. The attack on GEA-1 is based on an exceptional interaction of the deployed LFSRs and the key initialization, which is highly unlikely to occur by chance. This unusual pattern indicates that the weakness is intentionally hidden to limit the security level to 40 bit by design.

Music composed by Toby Fox and performed by Sean Schafianski.

Special Guests: Gaëtan Leurent and Håvard Raddum.

Links:

]]> A team of cryptanalysits presents the first publicly available cryptanalytic attacks on the GEA-1 and GEA-2 algorithms. Instead of providing full 64-bit security, they show that the initial state of GEA-1 can be recovered from as little as 65 bits of known keystream (with at least 24 bits coming from one frame) in time 240 GEA-1 evaluations and using 44.5 GiB of memory. The attack on GEA-1 is based on an exceptional interaction of the deployed LFSRs and the key initialization, which is highly unlikely to occur by chance. This unusual pattern indicates that the weakness is intentionally hidden to limit the security level to 40 bit by design.

Music composed by Toby Fox and performed by Sean Schafianski.

Special Guests: Gaëtan Leurent and Håvard Raddum.

Links:

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